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Transgenic Crops in the Age of Human Rights: 
Moral Uncertainty and Rational Risk Policy 
 
Jeffrey J. Mindrup 
INTRODUCTION 
History has proven it is characteristically human to modify the envi-
ronment for some perceived benefit.  Since the domestication of plants and 
animals more than 10,000 years ago, humankind has manipulated plants to 
improve yields and provide more food.  This process evolved from breed-
ing to crossbreeding and now to genetic engineering.  In 1996, the first ge-
netically modified crop available for commercial use reached the market.1  
In the ten years since, the use of genetically engineered or transgenic crops 
has proliferated at impressive rates despite an ongoing debate about the eth-
ical implications and possible consequences of genetically altered food.  
Between 2003 and 2004, the use of transgenic crops worldwide increased 
by 20% to a total of 200 million acres.2  In 2004, 8.25 million farmers in 17 
countries planted genetically altered crops, thereby joining a $4.7 billion 
market.3  The rate at which transgenic crops are overtaking traditional va-
rieties is even more surprising.  Between 1997 and 2002, the percentage of 
soybeans that were Roundup Ready® soybeans, a transgenic variety, in-
creased from 1.9% to 74% and transgenic cotton increased from just 4% in 
1997 to 70% in 2002.4  In addition to the proliferation of existing plants, 
scientists are developing and testing new varieties with traits ranging from 
pest and drought resistance to improved nutrition and taste.5 
Despite this growth, or perhaps because of it, the argument over trans-
genic crops has only intensified over the past ten years.  At the same time, 
transgenic crops are often absent from broader discussions of the ethical 
propriety of genetic engineering.  The genetic alteration of plants shares 
many of the foundational issues that make ethical discussions of genetic 
engineering of humans and other animals so difficult.  Nevertheless, some 
substantial differences and the unique history of transgenic crops provide a 
 1 CLIVE JAMES, PREVIEW: GLOBAL STATUS OF COMMERCIALIZED BIOTECH/GM CROPS: 2004, at 
viii (ISAAA Briefs No. 32-2004), available at http://www.isaaa.org/Resources/publications/briefs/32/ 
download/isaaa-brief-32-2004.pdf. 
 2 Id. at iii. 
 3 Id. at iii, vii. 
 4 Michele C. Marra et al., The Payoffs to Transgenic Field Crops: An Assessment of the Evi-
dence, 5 AGBIOFORUM 43, 43 (2002), available at http://www.agbioforum.org/v5n2/v5n2a02-
marra.pdf. 
 5  See John Charles Kunich, Mother Frankenstein, Doctor Nature, and the Environmental Law 
of Genetic Engineering, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 807, 810 (2001). 
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unique opportunity to learn how to address the issues underlying the bio-
technology debate.  The importance of food has the public engaged—but 
substantially fewer moral and religious objections to genetically altered 
food remove some of the blinding passion that accompanies the idea of ge-
netically altered animals and humans.  The clear goals of using transgenic 
crops to abate world hunger and the existing regulatory structure also pro-
vide a framework for discussing issues related to genetic engineering that is 
absent when applying gene technology to animals or humans.  As such, the 
development of transgenic foods and the subsequent debate provide a 
unique learning opportunity for effectively structuring the debate of these 
difficult issues.  Mistakes by advocates and opponents of transgenic crops 
early in the discussion have polarized the arguments, obfuscated the pub-
lic’s understanding of the issues, and foreclosed a productive discourse 
about transgenic plants.  By appreciating mistakes made in handling an is-
sue that is less complex than those on the horizon, we can avoid the tempta-
tion to engage in empty rhetoric and properly weigh the benefits and risks 
of genetic engineering. 
DEVELOPMENT OF GENETIC ENGINEERING 
At a point near the end of the last European Ice Age, humans began 
domesticating and exploiting plants and animals.6  Throughout the past ten 
to fifteen thousand years, humanity has used the limits of available tech-
nology to manipulate plants to improve both the yield and the variety of the 
food supply.7  This activity took a great step forward in 1865 when Gregor 
Mendel, a Moravian monk who had been experimenting with peas, pub-
lished “Versuche über Pflanzen-Hybriden” (“Experiments with Plant Hybr-
ids”).8  By exposing the basic laws of heredity, Mendel’s work formed the 
foundation for modern genetics.  For over a hundred years, scientists, far-
mers, and even hobbyists applied Mendel’s lessons through traditional 
breeding techniques to transfer genes between the same or closely related 
species of plants and animals.9  Then, in the mid-1970s, scientists discov-
ered a process known as recombinant DNA technology, whereby scientists 
remove discrete sections of a DNA molecule and replace them with oth-
ers.10  The emergence of this technology immediately touched off ethical 
discussions in the scientific community.11 
 6 PETER J. UCKO & G.W. DIMBLEBY, THE DOMESTICATION AND EXPLOITATION OF PLANTS AND 
ANIMALS, at xvii (Aldine Publishing Co. 1968). 
 7 See id. at xvii–xx. 
 8 GREGOR MENDEL, EXPERIMENTS IN PLANT HYBRIDISATION (Harv. Univ. Press 1965) (1866);  
See also PETER PRINGLE, FOOD INC.: MENDEL TO MONSANTO—THE PROMISES AND PERILS OF THE 
BIOTECH HARVEST 9 (Simon & Schuster 2003). 
 9 See Karen Charman, “Biotechnology Will Feed the World” and Other Myths, 6 PR WATCH 
NEWSLETTER (Ctr. for Media & Democracy, Madison, WI), Oct.–Dec.  1999, at 8, available at 
http://www.prwatch.org/prwv6n4.pdf. 
 10 THOMAS A. SHANNON, MADE IN WHOSE IMAGE? GENETIC ENGINEERING AND CHRISTIAN 
ETHICS 4 (Humanity Books 2000). 
 11 See LISA YOUNT, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND GENETIC ENGINEERING 10 (Facts on File rev. ed. 
2004). 
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Though part of an ongoing scientific debate, genetic engineering took 
a significant legal turn in 1980 in the seminal case of Diamond v. Chakra-
barty.12  In Chakrabarty, the United States Supreme Court observed that 
the “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas” were not pa-
tentable under 35 U.S.C. § 10113 because new plants and minerals are “ma-
nifestations of . . . nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to 
none.”14  However, in a 5-4 decision, the Court determined a human-made, 
genetically engineered bacterium was patentable as a new and useful 
“manufacture or composition of matter.”15  The Court stated Congress in-
tended the statute to “include anything under the sun that is made by 
man.”16  In reaching its decision, the Court rejected arguments made in an 
amicus brief filed by scientists and ethicists suggesting a “parade of hor-
ribles,” including the potential for pollution and disease as well as the loss 
of biological diversity.17  The Court reasoned any action it might take 
would have little effect deterring the scientific mind and that such determi-
nations of policy were for the legislative process.18 
HUNGER AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
As the Court noted, the decision in Chakrabarty did not spawn genetic 
engineering, but it did dramatically affect the debate.  Proponents of genet-
ically modified organisms, which now included agribusiness interests, be-
gan to tout the potential for transgenic crops to end world hunger.  The po-
litical environment was also ripe for transgenic crops.  As part of a global 
human rights movement, the United Nations declared in 1974, “[e]very 
man, woman, and child has the inalienable right to be free from hunger and 
malnutrition in order to develop fully and maintain his physical and mental 
faculties.”19  Ethicists concerned about human rights also targeted Ameri-
can foreign policy.  Author Henry Shue argued that certain things were 
“basic rights”—those goods that are necessary for the enjoyment of any 
other rights.20  Control of these goods, food being among the most obvious, 
creates a duty not to deprive and a duty to aid the hungry.21  Despite the fo-
cus on human rights, improvements in agriculture, and changes in the 
world economy, the number of malnourished people around the world has 
been consistently more than 800 million for decades.22  Dramatic growth in 
 12 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
 13 Id. at 309. 
 14 Id. (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)). 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)). 
 17 Id. at 316. 
 18 Id. at 317. 
 19 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 869 (Warren T. Reich et al. eds., Simon & Schuster MacMil-
lan rev. ed. 1995) [hereinafter BIOETHICS]. 
 20 HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 22–29 
(Princeton Univ. Press 2d ed. 1996). 
 21 Id. at 55–60. 
 22 See, e.g., 2 BIOETHICS, supra note 19, at 869; FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., THE STATE 
OF FOOD INSECURITY IN THE WORLD 2004, at 5 graph (2004), available at 
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the world’s population and the depletion of natural resources raise serious 
questions about the carrying capacity of the earth as we begin the twenty-
first century.23  Biotechnology offers transgenic crops as a key component 
in solving both the agricultural and environmental crises. 
BENEFITS OF TRANSGENIC CROPS 
The dire situation regarding world hunger and population growth pro-
vides proponents of biotechnology with their strongest argument.  From the 
beginning, transgenic crops have benefited from the clear goal of reducing 
world hunger.  Many scientists who have devoted their lives to improving 
food and food production around the world argue that genetic engineering 
is essential “to improve the quantity, quality, and availability of food.”24  
Proponents of biotechnology see agricultural improvements as indispensa-
ble to the ability to feed the 8.3 billion people anticipated in the next quar-
ter century.25  Transgenic crops offer increased yields, dependability, and 
nutritional quality to food producers around the world.26  Improvements in 
food production could have beneficial effects on the environment as well.  
Replacing traditional crops with transgenic varieties could allow farmers to 
bring less land under cultivation, which would protect natural habitat and 
actually preserve biodiversity.27  Transgenic crops also offer the potential 
to conserve environmental resources by reducing pesticide and herbicide 
use as well as creating foods more fit to the local environment.28  In this 
way, transgenic crops become a win-win proposition—crops that produce 
higher yields with less harm to the environment.  In theory, and more re-
cently in practice, scientists are able to tailor crops to a particular growing 
environment or the nutritional needs of a particular population.  Scientists 
around the world have developed plants that “resist insects, disease, 
drought, salt, and herbicides.”29  The Third World is already benefiting 
from the technology.  Small-scale farmers in Africa, who desperately need 
agricultural technology to improve food production in some of the most 
acidic soil in the world,30 benefit from transgenic seeds and crop protection 
technologies targeted to local growing conditions and practices.31  Given 
 
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/007/y5650e/y5650e00.pdf. 
 23 2 BIOETHICS, supra note 19, at 870–71. 
 24 See Norman Borlaug, Letter to the Editor, Open Letter to the Editor, INDEPENDENT (London), 
Apr. 20, 2000, reprinted in THE ETHICS OF FOOD:  A READER FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 74, 77 
(Gregory E. Pence ed., 2002) [hereinafter ETHICS OF FOOD]. 
 25 See id. at 78. 
 26 Id. at 79. 
 27 Kurt Buechle, Note, The Great, Global Promise of Genetically Modified Organisms: Overcom-
ing Fear, Misconceptions, and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 
283, 290 (2001). 
 28 SHANNON, supra note 10, at 13. 
 29 YOUNT, supra note 11, at 13. 
 30 Cornell University News Service, Crop Engineered to Grow in Poisonous Soil, SCIENCE 
DAILY, Aug. 29, 2007, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/08/070827153025.htm. 
 31 See Florence Wambugu, Why Africa Needs Agricultural Biotech, in GENETICALLY MODIFIED 
FOODS: DEBATING BIOTECHNOLOGY 304, 305 (Michael Ruse & David Castle eds., 2002) [hereinafter 
GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS]. 
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the disparities of world food distribution, it is disingenuous for privileged 
societies to take an excessively cautious approach to genetically engineered 
foods when the vast majority of humankind cannot afford that luxury.32 
To proponents, society reaps these benefits at little cost.  Characteriz-
ing the process as an extension of traditional breeding practices, genetic 
engineers find no moral objection to manipulating nature to develop trans-
genic crops.33  In fact, some see genetic engineering as preferable because 
it is more precise than traditional breeding methods.34  While traditional 
breeding transfers genes between organisms, genetic modification involves 
moving only a single gene.35  Thus, the ability arises to make beneficial 
combinations that were impossible by traditional breeding.  Genetic scien-
tists then use these combinations to engineer products suited to the planting 
conditions or nutritional needs of a certain area, thereby increasing food 
production and nutrition in ways not possible without biotechnology.36  
While science must be respectful of natural processes and wary of hubris, 
the reality of human expansion demands the increased production and nu-
trition biotechnology can provide. 
OPPOSITION TO TRANSGENIC CROPS 
Despite the admirable goals and potential benefits of transgenic crops, 
biotechnology faces persistent opposition.  The arguments against biotech-
nology generally take two forms: 1) moral or ethical objections to tamper-
ing with nature, and 2) a fear of unintended consequences, which tends to 
focus on human health and the environment.  For many reasons, the prelim-
inary development of biotechnology did not involve a significant debate 
about the wisdom of genetic engineering itself.  First, there was little orga-
nized opposition to confront the rapidly developing technology.37  Those 
who held views that science should not meddle with nature were isolated 
and were not organized.  Next, as demonstrated by the Chakrabarty Court’s 
treatment of ethical concerns, opponents had difficulty finding an audience 
for vague moral arguments urging restraint.  In contrast to the proponents 
of genetic engineering who express clear goals of ending hunger, moral ob-
jections prove difficult to articulate.38  The relation of genetic engineering 
of crops and animals to traditional breeding and natural evolution also 
muted many of the concerns that the public eventually developed in rela-
tion to genetic modification of human beings.  At the time the first genera-
tion of modified crops were entering development, there was very little 
 32 Borlaug, supra note 24, at 77–78. 
 33 See J. Howard Beales III, Modification and Consumer Information: Modern Biotechnology and 
the Regulation of Information, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 105, 106 (2000). 
 34 C. of Food, Agric., & Envtl. Sci., Ohio St. Univ., GMO: FAQ (Frequently Asked Questions),   
http://web.archive.org/web/20020403135603/http://ohioline.osu.edu/gmo/faq.html (last visited Sept. 1, 
2007) [hereinafter OSU GMO FAQ]. 
 35 Id.  
 36 See SHANNON, supra note 10, at 13. 
 37 See Kunich, supra note 5, at 813–14. 
 38 See 2 BIOETHICS, supra note 19, at 932. 
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emphasis on wrongness because there was, and continues to be, no general 
concern for plant welfare.39  Moreover, since humans had been breeding 
plants and animals for much of history, opponents had the burden of show-
ing how the use of the new technology was ethically suspect.40  In time, 
opponents have attempted to articulate a fundamental difference between 
traditional breeding and the splicing of traits between species, but this dis-
tinction has not really appeared to take root with the public.41 
MORAL CONSIDERATIONS AND THE LACK OF RELIGIOUS OBJECTION 
A dearth of religious objection to genetic engineering compounds the 
difficulty of articulating a moral objection to genetically altered foods.  In 
fact, most religions find genetically modified organisms compatible with 
their doctrine—even supporting biotechnology if used properly.42  The is-
sue then becomes not a question of if but a question of how.  Much of the 
religious acceptance of interventions in nature proceeds from the Bible.  In 
Genesis, God commands humanity to take dominion over the earth: “[F]ill 
the earth and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over 
the birds of the air.”43  Starting from this premise, the Catholic view of ge-
netic engineering has evolved but has remained consistently supportive.  In 
fact, the Second Vatican Council (“Vatican II”) determined mastery over 
nature was part of God’s will.44  Rather than being deterred from building 
up the world, man is compelled to do so.45  The view of many who contri-
buted to Vatican II is that man is a co-creator with God.46  However, Vati-
can II did recognize limitations on man’s role as a creator, stating, “[A]ll 
things are endowed with their own stability, truth, goodness, proper laws, 
and order.  Man must respect these as he isolates them by the appropriate 
methods of the individual science or arts.”47  This approach recognizes the 
legitimacy of altering nature and the autonomy of science as long as the 
creator is given proper reverence. 
Pope John Paul II modified the approach taken by Vatican II, but did 
not reject it.  In his view, since the order of nature, though not fixed, had its 
origin in God, man’s guide must be in harmony with the law of nature.48  
At the Jubilee of the Agricultural World, November 11, 2000, Pope John 
Paul II noted the concerns of the scientific community about the sustaina-
bility of the present agricultural system.49  Specifically addressing the ge-
 39 Id. at 936. 
 40 Id. at 933. 
 41 See Kunich, supra note 5, at 812-13. 
 42 2 BIOETHICS, supra note 19, at 932. 
 43 Genesis 1:28. 
 44 SHANNON, supra note 10, at 36. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. at 38. 
 47 Id. at 42. 
 48 Id. at 36. 
 49 Pope John Paul II, Address at Jubilee of the Agricultural World (Nov. 11, 2000), reprinted in 
GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS, supra note 31, at 111, 111–14. 
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netically engineered food, he expressed the need for the utmost care in the 
assessment and valuation of the consequences of modification.50  The Pope 
cautioned, “[Biotechnologies] must be submitted beforehand to rigorous 
scientific and ethical examination, to prevent them from becoming disastr-
ous for human health and the future of the earth.”51  Though the Catholic 
position is rooted in natural law, there is no morally absolute objection to 
genetic engineering based on that natural law.  In the absence of a complete 
prohibition, the focus becomes one of personal responsibility and steward-
ship to prevent exploitation and unintended consequences.52 
Though also cognizant of the biblical text, the Protestant approach is 
slightly different.  However, it too stops well short of a prohibition of ge-
netic modification.  Taking a more holistic approach, Protestants tend to 
locate the debate within an ecological setting.53  One view finds this differ-
ence possibly rooted in the Reformation, which emphasized sin and its de-
structive effects on humanity.54  In contrast to the Catholic view, the Prot-
estant position derives more from a concept of stewardship than one of 
natural law.55  For example, Methodists see God as the creator, man as his 
stewards, and technology in service to both humanity and God.56  Similar-
ly, the Orthodox Church sees humanity as “both a given and a potential.”57  
Again, the emphasis is on the use and consequences of genetics rather than 
prohibition based on any moral argument. 
Although the issue is very complex under Jewish law and the doctrine 
is still evolving—there is no outright objection to genetically modified 
foods.58  Judaism takes the view that God created the universe but left it in 
an incomplete state.59  God created Adam as a partner who is charged with 
completing the creation by finding the cure for disease and producing 
enough food for the hungry.60  Technology should work toward the benefit 
of humanity without violating divine rules.61  This approach defers the de-
termination of morality to the assessment of the consequences.  The bene-
fits must outweigh the risks, but if they do, genetically engineered foods 
have a place in society. 
Similar to the scriptural approach taken by other religions, Islam 
adopts a worldview rooted in revelation.62  Religious leaders conduct a 
 50 Id. at 112. 
 51 Id. 
 52 SHANNON, supra note 10, at 55. 
 53 Id. at 78. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. at 79. 
 56 Id. at 61. 
 57 Id. at 62. 
 58 See Carl Feit, Genetically Modified Food and Jewish Law (Halakhah), in GENETICALLY 
MODIFIED FOODS, supra note 31, at 123, 124. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at 124. 
 62 Mohammad Fadel, Islam and the New Genetics, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 901, 901 (2001). 
MINDRUP_213-242_JAM 2/20/2008 8:13 AM 
220 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 11:213 
                                                          
case-by-case analysis of emerging technologies based on four sources: the 
Qur’an; God’s word as revealed to Mohammed; the sunna, the normative 
practice of the Prophet Muhammad here on earth; and community stan-
dards.63  If none of these is available, the leaders adopt a utilitarian ap-
proach.64  In practice, the assessment of a new technology or situation de-
pends on reason by analogy—a practice that seems similar to common law 
jurisprudence in the United States and England.  Under the Islamic ap-
proach, human intervention in nature is permissible so long as the purpose 
for the intervention is for the benefit of human beings.65  Man does not vi-
olate any prohibition against changing God’s creation if he promotes wel-
fare by reducing need or treating a disease.66  However, those leaders in the 
Islamic community who are more conservative do favor complete prohibi-
tion.  As evidence of the impropriety of tampering with nature, these lead-
ers rely on the passage of the Qur’an which provides: “And He created eve-
rything, and determined [each thing] precisely.”67  If God created each 
thing precisely, man has no authority to tamper with God’s creation.  
Another well-established principle in Muslim ethics may also have a prac-
tical effect on whether transgenic crops are morally acceptable.  Muslims 
believe that the removal of existing harm deserves greater precedence than 
achieving new benefits. 68  Even if it is not always conceptually easy to dis-
tinguish the difference, this precept may suggest a different approach on a 
case-by-case basis.69  Although no general prohibition exists, Islamic ethics 
may require a specific assessment of goals before adopting genetically 
modified foods as the solution. 
This brief examination of religious views on genetic engineering de-
monstrates the absence of a per se prohibition on genetic enhancement of 
the world’s food supply based on religion.  Moreover, the judiciary has also 
foreclosed any personal religious objection by finding that the United 
States’ regulatory scheme, which allows transgenic crops to be sold without 
labeling, does not violate the free exercise of religion by persons who ob-
ject to transgenic crops.70  Absent any religious objection, the analysis of 
the morality of transgenic crops largely lends itself to an assessment of the 
risks and rewards.  The focus becomes eliminating unintended conse-
quences and assuring that the intended consequences are just.  The analysis 
is utilitarian in nature, deciding how to best use the technology for the ben-
efit of humankind, rather than based in moral absolutes.  As such, oppo-
nents have struggled to articulate an argument against genetically altered 
crops based on morality. 
 63 Id. at 901–02. 
 64 Id. at 902. 
 65 Id. at 903. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. at 904 n.6 (quoting al-Furqan 25:2 (THE QUR’AN)). 
 68 Id. at 909–10. 
 69 Id. at 910. 
 70 See Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 179–80 (D.D.C. 2000). 
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LOST OPPORTUNITY 
This difficulty of articulating moral opposition to transgenic crops and 
genetic engineers’ reaction to it represents a primary failing in the discus-
sion regarding the exploration of biotechnology.  Proponents did not find 
anything intrinsically wrong from a theological point of view nor any well-
framed argument against genetic engineering.  As such, they assumed their 
desired ends were just and forged ahead without engaging the community 
in a meaningful dialogue that could have ameliorated many of the public’s 
misgivings about biotechnology.  Whether borne of arrogance, a drive for 
profits, or a single-minded devotion to discovery, some scientists and agri-
business executives failed to understand that, for many people around the 
world, there is still an ethical issue to balance with the laudable goal of 
feeding the hungry. 
Science is an institution that deserves great respect, but that respect re-
sults from the efforts of those visionaries who have explained to the public 
how a scientific discovery could benefit humankind.  In the laboratory, the 
scientific method operates independently of social pressures, but to realize 
its potential, science must interact with the outside world.  Science has the 
ability to create new technology, but the proper use of that technology is 
often a matter of values.  Science must inform traditional beliefs, but also 
proceed with an understanding of the anxiety caused by the displacement of 
existing values.  Further complicating the issue, science is not fully operat-
ing in its normal fashion in the development of many transgenic plants.  
Collegial competition and peer review yield to market competition, the 
threat of negative publicity, and the jealous protection of patents.  These 
factors foster an atmosphere of secrecy that engenders societal skepticism. 
EVOLVING OPPOSITION 
Critics of transgenic crops also accuse proponents of portraying the 
skeptical public as misinformed or uneducated.71  For example, Leon Kass, 
currently Chairman of the President’s Council on Bioethics (the “Coun-
cil”), suggests that scientists cast the issue as beneficial knowledge versus 
ignorant and superstitious anxiety.72  Given the larger issues involved, Kass 
believes the public is right to be ambivalent about genetic engineering.73  
He believes people’s worries are in touch with the deepest matters of hu-
man dignity, and we ignore them at our peril.74 
Despite the expansion of transgenic crops and the difficulty of ex-
pressing moral opposition without a religious objection, opponents of 
transgenic crops continue to press arguments for limiting genetic engineer-
 71 Matthew Rich, Note, The Debate Over Genetically Modified Crops in the United States: Reas-
sessment of Notions of Harm, Difference, and Choice, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 889, 900–01 (2004). 
 72 LEON R. KASS, LIFE, LIBERTY, AND THE DEFENSE OF DIGNITY: THE CHALLENGE FOR 
BIOETHICS 120 (2002). 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
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ing itself.  Groups opposed to genetically altered crops argue that the per-
sistent resistance in Europe, the United States, and around the world de-
monstrates public resistance to genetically engineered food independent of 
possible consequences.75  Notwithstanding the acceptance of genetic engi-
neering by the world’s organized religions, many opponents of biotechnol-
ogy still build their arguments for prohibition or restraint on a basis of va-
gue spirituality.  A useful device in the debate about genetically altered 
food has been to focus any discussion of morality on the genetic alteration 
of humans and then project the public’s uncertainty or apprehension back 
to genetic alteration in any form, including the alteration of plants.76  The 
idea is to gain support for categorical prohibition against any type of inter-
vention in nature based on morality and driven by fear of chimeras or loss 
of humanity.  Though some objections to genetic alteration are real, such 
arguments when made by interested groups appear to be designed to capi-
talize on the resurgence of piety and sanctimonious environmental activism 
currently en vogue in American culture. 
More constructively, ethicists struggle to find real limitations on 
science and self-interest in an age when technology and the rate of ad-
vancement can quickly surpass our ability to understand the personal, so-
cial, and cultural implications of a new discovery.  Representative of this 
effort, the Council reflects the struggle between progress and the amorph-
ous apprehension many people still hold about genetic engineering.  The 
Council sees biotechnology as a form of human empowerment, but the 
techniques of the technology do not define its purposes.77  Therefore, socie-
ty’s focus must be on the abilities and goals of biotechnology, rather than 
the process itself.78  By adopting this view, the Council concedes the va-
lidity of genetic engineering and aligns itself with the position held by the 
majority of the world’s religions.  As such, the issue again becomes a mat-
ter of degree or balance rather than a complete prohibition. 
The Council seems to suggest a limitation on genetic engineering 
based on a vague religiosity and a form of natural law affected by modern 
environmentalism.79  Wary of “upsetting eons of gradual and exacting evo-
lution,” the Council is concerned with the problem of hubris.80  The Coun-
cil also notes the precautionary principle and its conservative approach to 
interventions into the natural world with some deference, but never actually 
adopts the principle’s heavy burden on new technology.81  Instead, the 
 75 Gregory E. Kaebnick, On Genetic Engineering and the Idea of the Sacred: A Secular Argu-
ment, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 863, 863–64 (2001). 
 76 Id. 
 77 See THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, BEYOND THERAPY: BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE 
PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS 2 (2003), available at http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/ 
beyondtherapy/beyond_therapy_final_webcorrected.pdf [hereinafter COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS]. 
 78 Id. at 2–3. 
 79 Id. at 287. 
 80 Id. 
 81 See id.  The precautionary principle is an environmental idea that posits, “[w]hen an activity 
raises threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken 
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Council proposes that “[m]odesty born of gratitude for the world’s ‘given-
ness’ may enable us to recognize that not everything in the world is open to 
any use we may desire or devise . . . .”82  Noting man’s Promethean aspira-
tion to remake nature to serve our purposes and satisfy our desires, the 
Council states that this approach is erroneous because it risks unintended 
consequences and reveals an improper disposition to the naturally given 
world.83  The Council’s observations are of little help in determining any 
practical limitation on science and the role of the law or government in de-
ciding or moderating complex moral issues.  It is difficult to translate an 
academic argument about the proper disposition toward nature into an un-
derstanding of what ought to be and how the law can effectuate that desired 
result.  Although the impact on the environment and the resulting effects on 
humanity are central to the discussion of genetic engineering, the absence 
of ethical directives about what ought to be done leaves us with limitations 
designed to avoid unintended consequences.84 
The Council also observes that part of the trouble with genetic engi-
neering is that the uncertainty of the goals that should ensure man’s inter-
ventions are not just representations of will or ends in themselves.85  How-
ever, this potential criticism does not readily apply in the field of transgenic 
crops.  Putting any profit motive aside, everyone would agree that provid-
ing the means for the world’s population to feed itself is an admirable goal.  
Accordingly, transgenic crops should be an easier issue on which to reach 
consensus than genetic engineering of animals or humans.  Focusing on the 
specific issue of transgenic crops would elevate the debate about the pru-
dence of genetic engineering. Scientists and the public could then work to-
gether to determine whether transgenic crops are proper tools to increase 
food production and, if so, the ways in which society can acceptably use 
these tools. 
While the Council represents a view of genetic engineering that re-
flects a cautionary approach based in a vague, contemporary religiosity, 
others have attempted secular explanations for a reluctance to tamper with 
nature.  Philosopher Gregory E. Kaebnick argues that terms like “Franken-
food,” a term commonly used by critics to describe genetically modified 
plants, reveal that part of the public’s concern is with meddling per se.86  In 
addition to concern about unintended consequences, the terminology sug-
gests concern about tampering with something intrinsically valuable to hu-
manity.  Kaebnick argues the apprehension about biotechnology is not reli-
 
even if some cause-and-effect relationships are not fully established scientifically.” Science and Envi-
ronmental Health Network, Wingspread Statement on the Precautionary Principle, (1998), 
http://www.sehn.org/state.html#w [hereinafter Wingspread Statement]. 
 82 COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 77, at 289. 
 83 Id. at 287–89. 
 84 MICHAEL J. REISS & ROGER STRAUGHAN, IMPROVING NATURE?: THE SCIENCE AND ETHICS OF 
GENETIC ENGINEERING 63 (1996). 
 85 COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 77, at 289. 
 86 Kaebnick, supra note 75, at 864. 
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gious, but instead is a secular version of the sacred.87  Employing Ronald 
Dworkin’s view of the sacred, Kaebnick notes: “[t]he most compelling ex-
ample of a secular notion of the sacred is the widespread view that the en-
vironment ought to be treated with respect.”88  Perhaps rooted in Henry 
David Thoreau’s Walden, in which the author chronicled his life in the 
woods, the modern environmental movement urges ethical limitations on 
humanity’s interactions with the natural world.89  Humanity’s exploitation 
of the environment for its own ends at the expense of other species violates 
something sacred.90 
Conceptually, it is easy to support the idea of man living harmonious-
ly with nature.  To an extent, humanity’s unique ability to alter the natural 
order imposes a duty of stewardship.  Most people agree it is in humanity’s 
interest for nature to thrive in diversity.  However, taken too far, this idea 
of harmony denies the reality of limited resources and the brutality of na-
ture itself.  Throughout history, men and women have battled other men 
and women as well as other species for the resources needed for survival.  
The only remedy for this ongoing struggle is to increase the supply of re-
sources, or to lower the demand for existing resources.  Recognition of this 
reality is essential to an informed debate about humankind’s relationship 
with nature. 
Furthermore, as we have seen, the difficulty with an appeal to the sa-
cred is that it seems “vague, inarticulable, and emotional, particularly when 
compared to the central concepts of Kantian or utilitarian thought.”91  As 
such, moral discussions of the sacred are difficult to criticize or defend.92  
This ambiguity makes it particularly difficult to engage in a productive dis-
cussion of limits, especially when proponents of biotechnology are entre-
preneurs and intrepid scientists, both of whom deal in concrete, analytical 
terms.  Further, desire compels scientists and entrepreneurs to remove limi-
tations even when they seem insurmountable.  This compulsion is hardly 
conducive to a dialogue with opponents espousing vague notions of the sa-
cred, no matter how widely held. 
In attempting to define a means by which we can argue about the sa-
cred, Kaebnick roots the concept in the philosophical tradition based on 
deeper values or virtues.93  Traditionally, virtue ethics includes respect for 
“thicker values” like kindness, honor, integrity, responsibility, loyalty, hu-
mility, and conscientiousness, as opposed to “thinner” values like autono-
my and utility.94  The sacred reincorporates moral beliefs about humanity’s 
relationship with nature in contrast to popular notions of maximizing hap-
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. at 865. 
 89 HENRY DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN (1910). 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. at 866. 
 94 Id. 
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piness or eliminating deprivations of some feature of rationality that offer 
little help with defining the proper relationship.95  To this end, Kaebnick 
suggests adopting a deontological counterpart to the consequentialist “cau-
tionary principle,” which he describes as holding that a novel project or en-
deavor that realistically might cause harm to the environment or public 
health may not be undertaken until there is reasonable evidence that harm 
can be avoided.96  In the same way, the sacred view treats the world with 
restraint, shifting the burden of proof to those proposing a new type of in-
tervention.97  Any discussions of proposed interactions with nature must 
begin with recognition of the value in leaving nature as it is regardless of 
consequences.98  An absolute ban is not necessary under a secular ap-
proach, but a reasoned public debate requires acknowledging deep-seated 
convictions about our relationship with the natural world. 
AGRIBUSINESS RESPONDS 
Although moral objections are difficult to articulate, the corporations 
developing transgenic crops have become more responsive to ethical con-
cerns.  Similar to the virtue ethics underpinning a secular notion of the sa-
cred, some companies that develop transgenic seeds have adopted a ste-
wardship model much like that espoused by several of the leading 
religions.  For example, DuPont, a leading manufacturer of transgenic 
seeds, adopted guiding principles based on ensuring food safety, protecting 
the environment, conserving biodiversity, and engaging stakeholders, as 
well as working to improve food, nutrition and the quality of life.99  Seed 
companies like DuPont see themselves as respectful of the wishes of socie-
ty and protecting the environment with caution and care while balancing 
those interests with the need for increased productivity.  Keeping in mind 
the obvious influence of a well-compensated public relations department, 
DuPont’s statement and similar pledges by others in the biotechnology in-
dustry, represents an attempt to re-engage the public in a discussion of dif-
ficult issues.  While skepticism is reasonably appropriate, the shared lan-
guage of stewardship and responsibility should serve as a starting point for 
a dialogue about basic moral issues and the benefits and risks that are the 
heart of debate over genetic engineering. 
PRACTICAL LIMITATIONS AND THE RISK OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 
In addition to the persistent, though amorphous, moral objection some 
individuals have to transgenic crops, much of the public and many in the 
scientific community share concerns about the risks posed by such crops 
and whether the purported benefits outweigh the risks to health and the en-
 95 Id. at 871–72. 
 96 Id. at 872–73. 
 97 Id. at 872–73, 876. 
 98 Id. at 872–73. 
 99 DuPont, Bioethics Guiding Principles,  http://www.dupont.com/biotech/difference/ 
principles.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2007). 
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vironment.100  Although the rhetoric frequently suggests absolute moral li-
mitations, the details of the debate essentially boil down to scientific argu-
ments or assessments of risk.101  However, that reality does not eliminate a 
values-based discussion of transgenic crops, but merely alters the form of 
the discussion.  Risk-based cost-benefit analysis inherently involves ba-
lancing different practical and ethical interests to reach a consensus that 
enables action. 
In the cost-benefit area, opponents of genetic engineering employ 
scientific and socio-cultural arguments that are more tractable than those 
made for prohibition of genetic engineering based on moral absolutes.  
Though initially unprepared for the explosion of biotechnology in the 
1990s, critics now express tangible concerns about safety and the environ-
ment that frequently resonate with the public.102  As time has passed, op-
ponents of transgenic crops have more information to support their argu-
ments and an effective support network to publish their views. 
EROSION OF THE MORAL HIGH GROUND 
To start, opponents have tried to remove some of the moral high 
ground from those who claim transgenic crops will be able to feed the 
world.  Acknowledging the dire state of nutrition in the world, opponents 
argue that starvation is not a result of insufficient production, but is in fact 
a distribution problem.103  The United Nations World Food Program notes 
that there is currently more than enough food produced, but the problem is 
one of access.104  Failures in the distribution system and political pressures 
prevent adequate supplies of food from reaching those in need.  In addition, 
critics argue that many farmers cannot afford to grow modern crops and 
consumers cannot afford to buy them—a fact not helped by increased cor-
porate control over food resources.105  Further, many opponents believe the 
purported benefits of transgenic crops are not suited to ecological, small-
scale agriculture practiced by the majority of farmers around the world.106  
The high costs of research and development prompted many researchers to 
focus on seed varieties that would have the widest application world-
wide.107  Arguably, this broad approach has prevented many areas most in 
need of increased production from benefiting from the technology. 
 100 Marc A. Saner, Real and Metaphorical Moral Limits in the Biotech Debate, 19 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 609 (July 2001), reprinted in GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS, supra note 31, at 78–
79. 
 101 Id. at 78. 
 102 YOUNT, supra note 11, at 15. 
 103 Id. at 18. 
 104 Charman, supra note 9, at 9. 
 105 Id. 
 106 VANDANA SHIVA, Genetic Engineering and Food Security in STOLEN HARVEST, (South End 
Publisher 2000), reprinted in ETHICS OF FOOD, supra note 24, at 130, 132. 
 107  Matthew Feldman, et al., Why So Much Controversy Over Genetically Modified Organisms? 
Answers to 10 Frequently Asked Questions about GMOS, CIMMYT, Feb. 7, 2000, http://www.cimmyt. 
org/abc/10-faqaboutgmos/htm/10-faqaboutgmos.htm 
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The agribusiness corporations producing the majority of the modified 
crops have amplified the fear of a monopoly over the world’s food supply 
by aggressively protecting their research.  Following Chakrabarty and re-
lated legislation, breakthroughs in genetic engineering are patentable as in-
tellectual property.  Owners of those patents vigorously protect their pro-
prietary interests in significant ways.  Contrary to typical farming practices, 
farmers who purchase transgenic seeds cannot save and replant seeds.108  
This is a particular concern in developing countries where farmers have 
reused seeds for centuries to try to improve yields.109  Under a typical li-
censing agreement, farmers purchase seeds sold for a single season.110  The 
following planting season farmers must either re-license or purchase new 
seeds.111  Farmers accused of violating such agreements have found them-
selves defending lawsuits.112  In fact, one of the leading manufacturers of 
transgenic seeds, Monsanto, claims ownership for genes and plants contain-
ing its patented material regardless of where they are or how they got 
there.113  Further alarming farmers and many governments, Monsanto and 
the United States government hold a patent on so-called “terminator tech-
nology” that makes seeds sterile and of no value beyond a single plant-
ing.114  The dominant concern is that a few multinational corporations 
could control the entire food supply.  In response to a public outcry, there is 
an international moratorium on use of the seeds, but recent efforts to test 
the seeds in field trials have renewed concern about the technology.115  
While expressing legitimate concern, these arguments reveal that much of 
the apprehension surrounding genetic engineering is less about science or 
morality than it is about the economic influence of large multi-national 
corporations. 
The concentration of biotechnology and the potential for abuse is also 
a central concern of religious leaders who approve of genetic engineering 
in theory.  The Catholic Church has expressed concern that excessive intel-
lectual property rights to widely used crops could have a devastating im-
pact on developing nations.116  Pope John Paul II observed, “All too often, 
the fruits of scientific progress, rather than being placed at the service of 
the entire human community, are distributed in such a way that unjust in-
equalities are actually increased or even rendered permanent.”117  Noting 
 108 Rich, supra note 71, at 898. 
 109 See id. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterborer, 513 U.S. 179 (1995). 
 113 Rich, supra note 71, at 912. 
 114 Stephen Leahy, Ban Endures on Terminator Seeds, INTER PRESS SERVICE NEWS AGENCY, Feb. 
11, 2005, http://www.ipsnews.net/interna.asp?idnews=27410 
 115 Id. 
 116 Archbishop Agostino Marchetto, Address to the Convention Organized by the Catholic Uni-
versity of the Sacred Heart on the Theme of “New Frontiers for Bioethics: The Biotechnologies” (Nov. 
18, 2000), available at http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/secretariat_state/documents/rc_seg-
st_doc_20001118_marchetto-univ-sacred-heart_en.html. 
 117 Pope John Paul II, Message of the Holy Father to the Group “Jubilee 2000 Debt Cam-
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the “social mortgage” on all private property, he counseled, “The law of 
profit alone cannot be applied to that which is essential for the fight against 
hunger, disease and poverty.”118  Similarly, the World Council of Churches 
stated that, “justice is denied if ‘biotechnology is used to increase the con-
trol of the rich nations and groups over the biological resources of creation 
. . . .’”119  Islam also focuses on distributive justice, noting that “benefits 
should not be priced to exclude the poor and underprivileged from benefit-
ing from the advances of science.”120  Clearly, discussions of the proper al-
location of the benefits of transgenic crops should be a part of the public 
debate, but the risk of exploitation does not necessitate a prohibition on ge-
netic engineering. 
Unfortunately, even if all the questions about distribution are satisfac-
torily answered, the disagreement about the safety of genetically modified 
foods has undermined the ability for transgenic crops to help end world 
hunger.  Resistance to transgenic crops in Europe has spread to some of 
those who stand to benefit the most from the promises of new biotechnolo-
gy.  To the dismay of biotechnology supporters, several countries in dire 
need of food have refused donations that contained genetically altered 
grain.121  In August of 2002, the African nations of Zambia, Zimbabwe, 
Mozambique, and Malawi rejected U.S. corn from the United Nations Food 
Programme, citing fear of health risks or the loss of European markets for 
their own products.122  Whether economically or socially based, the criti-
cisms of biotechnology and the companies that own the patents have dra-
matically slowed the pace of implementation around the world. 
EVALUATING REAL RISK TO HUMAN HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
In addition to questioning the purported benefits, opponents also ex-
press genuine concern for potential risks to individual health and the envi-
ronment.  Critics contend that proper risk assessment requires more than 
we know.123  In contrast to traditional breeding, which enabled breeders to 
observe any untoward effects developed over time, rapid changes facili-
tated by genetic engineering could create wide-scale unintended conse-
quences.124  Most of the concerns focus on two areas: food safety and the 
effect on the environment.125  Opponents of transgenic crops express con-
cern about both the means and the ends of genetic engineering.  For exam-
ple, many see the introduction of genetically altered products into the food 
 
paign,”(Sept. 23, 1999), available at , http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/speeches/1999/ 
september/documents/hf_jp-ii_mes_23091999_jubilee-2000-debt-campaign_en.html. 
 118 Id. 
 119 SHANNON, supra note 10, at 65 (citations omitted). 
 120 Fadel, supra note 62, at 909 (citations omitted). 
 121 YOUNT, supra note 11, at 17–18. 
 122 Id. at 17–18. 
 123 2 BIOETHICS, supra note 22, at 933. 
 124 Id. 
 125 David Magnus & Arthur Caplan, Food for Thought: The Primacy of the Moral in the GMO 
Debate, in GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS supra note 31, at 80, 81. 
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supply as an experiment on unwilling subjects without following the scien-
tific method.126  Critics contend that testing has been inadequate at every 
stage of the process.  Moreover, scientists are splicing genes into food 
products from species that do not interbreed in nature and often have no 
history of food use.127  One of the primary health concerns is that allergens 
unknown to consumers could pose risk of illness or death.  For example, 
one variety of soybeans genetically altered with a protein from a Brazil nut 
had to be abandoned after millions of dollars of development when re-
searchers discovered people who were allergic to Brazil nuts were also al-
lergic to soybeans with the spliced protein.128 
Proponents counter that there is a consensus in the scientific commu-
nity that there is nothing inherently unsafe about splicing genes from one 
organism to another and that any disagreement about the process concerns 
specific classes and uses.129  They reiterate that safety depends on the 
food’s properties and have nothing to do with the process by which it is 
produced.130  Even though transgenic crops receive more testing than any 
other food item, critics argue that transgenic crops receive no extensive la-
boratory testing, leaving the effects of long-term exposure to transgenic 
crops largely unknown.131  The difficulty with this long-term exposure ar-
gument is that the same can be said for almost any scientific advancement 
relating to human beings, including everything from inoculations to elec-
tricity.  While uncertainty suggests caution, it certainly does not justify pa-
ralysis. 
A second area of concern is the potential impact of genetically altered 
plants on the environment. Some scientists note the dangers of releasing 
new organisms into existing ecosystems.132  In particular, concern centers 
on the difficulty of estimating the effects of genetic drift from modified 
plants to native populations, which could threaten the environment.  Such 
drift could reduce biodiversity as genetically enhanced plants take over and 
push out natural competitors. 133  The threat of genetic drift is not only theo-
retical, as gene flow may already be occurring.  Many in the scientific 
community were alarmed when genetically modified corn contaminated the 
national treasury of corn at Capulalpan, Mexico, despite the Mexican gov-
ernment’s prohibition on genetically modified corn—a program specifical-
ly designed to protect the native gene pool.134  This type of unintended drift 
 126 KATHLEEN HART, EATING IN THE DARK 4–8 (2002). 
 127 Mae-Wan Ho, The Unholy Alliance, 27 THE ECOLOGIST 152 (July-Aug. 1997), reprinted in 
ETHICS OF FOOD, supra note 24, at 80, 84.  See, e.g., HART, supra note 126, at 33 (listing genes with no 
history of food use being inserted into food products). 
 128 YOUNT, supra note 11, at 15; see also OSU GMO FAQ, supra note 34. 
 129 OSU GMO FAQ, supra note 34. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Thomas O. McGarity, Seeds of Distrust: Federal Regulation of Genetically Modified Foods, 35 
U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 403, 417 & n.84 (2002). 
 132 Rich, supra note 71, at 895–97. 
 133 Id. at 895–96. 
 134 Id. at 896–97. 
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could lead to a loss of biodiversity and a tendency toward uniformity that 
makes crops more vulnerable to pests and pathogens that will co-evolve.135 
Moreover, there is a risk that the genes could pass to wild relatives, 
creating what critics describe as “superweeds.”136  Wild plants that acquire 
genes that make them more resistant to herbicides would require stronger 
herbicides that in turn could do more damage to the environment or endan-
ger natural plants and animals that depend on those plants for food.  Simi-
larly, scientists are concerned about resistance to pesticides.  Corn with a 
gene from the bacterium Bacillus thuringensis (Bt) that is toxic to many in-
sects is one of the most widely planted transgenic crops.137  Critics worry 
that as insects build immunities to Bt toxins, new pesticides may have to be 
developed.138  In addition, the loss of Bt as a pesticide would be devastating 
to organic farming, which relies heavily on the natural pesticide.139 
Proponents admit that science does not yet know all of the effects of 
biotechnology.  Nevertheless, they suggest the risks are unlikely to mate-
rialize and that users can substantially reduce the risks by proper measures, 
such as planting refuges around fields of transgenic crops to sustain popula-
tions of insects susceptible to the toxins.140  Proponents also argue that 
transgenic crops have a less drastic effect on the environment than existing 
means.141  Even though many opponents of genetic engineering attempt to 
paint a picture of transgenic crops forced on the small, family farmer who 
wishes only to grow a few vegetables for sale at the local market, the reali-
ty is that industrial farms using large amounts of chemicals grow the major-
ity of the world’s food.142  Any change caused by genetic engineering must 
be seen in this context and not compared to an idyllic view of the American 
farmer that may have never existed, and certainly would not be able to re-
spond to the expanding agricultural needs of the world today. 
Opponents of transgenic crops agree that appropriate precautionary 
means can reduce the risks to health and the environment.143  Correspon-
dingly, proponents of genetically altered crops concede that the potential 
risks associated with some technologies outweigh the benefits.144  One nat-
 135 MARC LAPPE & BRITT BAILEY, AGAINST THE GRAIN: BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE CORPORATE 
TAKEOVER OF YOUR FOOD (Common Courage Press 1998), reprinted in ETHICS OF FOOD, supra note 
23, at 156, 158–63. 
 136 YOUNT, supra note 11, at 14; Rich, supra note 71, at 895. 
 137 YOUNT, supra note 11, at 14. 
 138 Rich, supra note 71, at 895. 
 139 CHARLES M. BENBROOK ET AL., PEST MANAGEMENT AT THE CROSSROADS 221 (1996); 
YOUNT, supra note 11, at 14. 
 140 OSU GMO FAQ, supra note 34. 
 141 See id. 
 142 See WENDELL BERRY, The Unsettling of America, in THE UNSETTLING OF AMERICA: CULTURE 
AND AGRICULTURE (1977), reprinted in ETHICS OF FOOD, supra note 24, at 5, 17–25; Skip Spitzer, In-
dustrial Agriculture and Corporate Power, GLOBAL PESTICIDE CAMPAIGNER Aug. 2003, at 1. 
 143 See RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 38 (2004) (discussing the 
process of bioconfinement as a method of reducing the dangers of transgenic crops) ; OSU GMO FAQ, 
supra note 32 (discussing the requirements of plant refuges to sustain nearby insect populations). 
 144 Magnus & Caplan, supra note 125, at 83. 
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ural philosophical framework for assessing the appropriate choices and 
means is utilitarianism.  Under this view, stakeholders must weigh the risks 
and benefits and determine which outcome maximizes utility as measured 
by the net benefit to society.145  As demonstrated by the abandonment of 
the soybean with the Brazil nut gene, some products may be too dangerous 
to develop in relation to the anticipated benefit while others are worth-
while.  Conceptually, a utilitarian view seems appropriate, but as applied, it 
proves very difficult given the range of values worldwide. 
RATIONAL RISK POLICY: ALLOCATING COSTS AND BENEFITS 
One issue that inevitably arises is who will bear the costs and who will 
reap the benefits.146  This issue has particular poignancy with respect to 
transgenic crops because private corporations in large industrialized coun-
tries primarily own the technology, whereas the targets are often the poor-
est countries of the third world.147  Moreover, the public is wary of the 
technology and assumes that the risks it perceives are motivated by the 
profit margins of privately held corporations.  Potential evidence of a 
skewed utility analysis is that most of the first generation crops appear to 
be suited to wide distribution and corporate profit motives, such as selling 
herbicides in conjunction with the seeds, rather than improving yields in 
difficult third world climates or improving nutrition or taste for consumers. 
VARIATIONS IN RISK TOLERANCE 
Another disabling feature is that individuals have vastly different le-
vels of tolerance for risk depending on their situation.  Rational people fre-
quently disagree about how much risk is acceptable given possible out-
comes—witness the stock market, the insurance industry, and Las Vegas.  
Different people look at the same information and reach different conclu-
sions.  For example, Judge Richard A. Posner argues that proponents of 
transgenic crops, like Indur Goklany, underestimate the danger that the 
process might get out of hand and that a genetically modified plant or ani-
mal will out-compete and destroy native species.148  In contrast, Goklany 
looks at the same evidence and believes the benefits clearly outweigh the 
costs.149  Goklany argues that opponents of genetically modified crops ig-
nore the potential downside of not using the technology because they deem 
the crops too risky.150  He observes that “[f]ew actions are either unmiti-
gated disasters or generate unadulterated benefits.”151  Therefore, in a situa-
 145 Id. 
 146 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 124–25  
(2002). 
 147 GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS, supra note 31, at 299. 
 148 POSNER, supra note 143, at 38–39 (2004). 
 149 Id.; INDUR M. GOKLANY, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF AM. BUS. POLICY STUDY 157: APPLYING 
THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE TO GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS, (Aug. 2000), reprinted in 
GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS, supra note 31, at 265, 266. 
 150 Id. at 265. 
 151 Id. at 266. 
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tion in which the outcome is ambiguous because both the costs and benefits 
are uncertain, you must compare all of the consequences and then deter-
mine which action is preferable.152  In certain situations, inaction could be 
the riskier behavior.153  This analysis demonstrates the difficulty in decid-
ing whether adopting transgenic crops or banning them entails more risk, 
especially given the degree of uncertainty and people’s varying levels of 
tolerance for risk.  Frequently, people are quick to assert their view as the 
correct one, but it is difficult to find “right” answers to matters so affected 
by personal values.  The number of variables and the lack of good informa-
tion on which to base effective risk assessments demonstrate the need for a 
sustained public dialogue on this issue rather than sensationalist headlines 
and visceral reactions. 
FLAWED RISK ANALYSIS 
The frequency with which risk decisions are flawed further compli-
cates any assessment of risk.  Research demonstrates that individuals over-
estimate the small risks they face and underestimate the more substantial 
ones.154  Moreover, when assessing risks, individuals tend to pay a great 
deal of attention to risks perceived as new or novel, but very little to those 
to which they have become accustomed.155  For example, a new food addi-
tive is more likely to get attention than risks posed by improper diet and 
lack of exercise.156  There is even dissonance within the food context.  
Many people reluctant to accept foods developed by what they see as an 
unnatural process have no problem eating foods with labels full of artificial 
ingredients and preservatives.  This tendency to be overly attentive to novel 
risks could cause the public to overestimate small risks associated with 
emerging biotechnologies, prompting consumers to make inefficient deci-
sions. 
Furthermore, modes of thinking and mental shortcuts that facilitate 
normal decision-making are often ineffective or even problematic in the 
risk context.157  Without cognitive shortcuts, individuals could not function 
when confronted by the astronomical number of choices modern society 
presents.  However, the shortcuts necessitated by everyday life are fre-
quently inadequate for rational risk assessment.  Risk ambiguity in a situa-
tion can generate irrational responses.158  In fact, three common fallacies 
apply with considerable force to the issue of transgenic crops.  These falla-
cies affect decision making about risk and associated cost-benefit analysis 
regarding potential environmental and health risks.159  First, people tend to 
 152 Id. at 265–66. 
 153 Id. at 266. 
 154 W. KIP VISCUSI, RATIONAL RISK POLICY 6 (1998). 
 155 Id. at 17. 
 156 Id. 
 157 SUNSTEIN, supra note 146, at 84. 
 158 VISCUSI, supra note 154, at 18. 
 159 SUNSTEIN, supra note 146, at 36. 
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believe that “risk is an all or nothing” proposition.160  An activity or prod-
uct must be either dangerous or safe.  Second, people are generally “com-
mitted to a belief in the benevolence of nature,” so people always see hu-
man activities as being more dangerous than natural ones.161  This belief in 
the benevolence of nature could cause opposition to transgenic crops with-
out understanding the harsh effects nature often has on agriculture in many 
parts of the world.  For some, a proper reverence for nature unrealistically 
forecloses tampering with nature in any way.  Finally, many people have a 
“zero-risk” mentality.162  Undoubtedly due in part to the significant scien-
tific advancements in the twentieth century, the public believes it is possi-
ble to remove all, or nearly all, of the risk from an activity.163  This belief 
creates unrealistic expectations and acts as a bar to potentially beneficial 
products such as transgenic crops.  For a technology to satisfy such a low 
level of acceptable risk, any benefit must be unrealistically large to coun-
terbalance even the smallest risk of harm.  Such standards could deny so-
ciety considerable benefits without an understanding of the corresponding 
costs. 
COMPOUNDED DIFFICULTY 
The divergence of expert scientific opinion regarding the safety of 
transgenic crops compounds the difficulties the public has assessing risk.  
When there are divergences in judgment regarding the degree of risk, 
people tend to place a greater weight on the worst-case scenario.164  Sub-
stantial disagreement in the scientific community is likely to cause not only 
confusion but also alarmist responses.165  The strong resistance to transgen-
ic crops in Europe and the growing resistance in the United States, despite 
any evidence of an adverse health effect, arguably demonstrate such a re-
sponse.  Adding to the difficulty of accurately assessing risk, “self-
interested private groups are entirely willing to exploit the underlying 
forces” to promote a particular point of view.166  For example, the manu-
facturers of transgenic crops exploit concerns about population growth and 
public compassion for the world’s hungry for financial gain under a thin 
auspice of altruism.167  Similarly, “European companies have tried to play 
up fears of genetically engineered food as a way of fending off competition 
from American farmers.”168  Politicians and environmental groups have al-
so exploited uncertainty about genetic engineering to promote their own 
interests.169 
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Instead of improving the assessment process, political and social 
forces exacerbate the cognitive limitations confronting risk assessments.  
As discussed above, opponents tend to minimize or even ignore risks pre-
sented by alternatives to biotechnology.  Often risk analysis requires as-
sessment of risk-risk tradeoffs.170  There may be competing risks arising 
from an alternative policy or behavioral responses to it, but activists tend to 
downplay or ignore the alternative risks.171  For example, if genetically 
modified crops allow better yields under lower tillage, the preservation of 
natural habitat may present a net benefit in biodiversity and environmental 
protection.  Similarly, if transgenic crops in fact require fewer herbicides, 
the environment may benefit overall as compared to conventional practices.  
On the other hand, if proponents are unable to convince the intended bene-
ficiaries of relief that transgenic crops represent a safe alternative, as was 
the case with the rejected food relief in Africa in 2002,172 the purported 
benefit does not materialize and may not justify the risk.  In contrast to the 
currently polarized positions in the debate over transgenic crops, effective 
risk analysis will require a collaborative effort to overcome the problems 
people have assessing risk. 
If people do not have accurate risk perceptions, providing information 
can remedy the market failure.173  Information can play an important role in 
fostering better risk decisions.174  The disagreement about the risks asso-
ciated with transgenic crops and the cognitive limitations affecting the as-
sessment of those risks suggest both the importance and the difficulty of 
designing an appropriate regulatory regime.  Effective risk analysis is both 
necessary for regulation and potentially aided or impeded by it. Information 
generated by the regulatory process can assist individuals in making indi-
vidual risk assessments.  In the nature of a feedback loop, the public dis-
course, which includes actions by government agencies, shapes individual 
risk judgments that then feed back into the public discourse.175  In this way, 
the risk assessment process compounds the effect of inaccurate informa-
tion.  As such, only a system that provides accurate information to the pub-
lic can foster an environment in which the public can reach a consensus on 
the difficult issue of genetic engineering. 
REGULATION OF TRANSGENIC CROPS 
Opponents of the current regulatory framework for transgenic crops in 
the United States criticize it as too deferential to business interests.176  The 
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process by which the government implemented the current regulatory sys-
tem fostered these criticisms and resulted in another failure of proponents 
of transgenic crops to effectively engage the public.  In an atypical move, 
executives from Monsanto met with Vice President George Bush at the 
White House in 1986 and requested regulation of genetically altered food 
designed to reassure the public that the underlying science was safe.177  Ra-
ther than engage the public in a rational dialogue about the risks and bene-
fits of genetic engineering to ensure public acceptance, Monsanto purpor-
tedly adopted a strategy of manipulating market perceptions.  Initially, the 
biotechnology industry traded political capital to get favored regulations, 
while gradually trying to win support from the public and environmental 
groups.178  In time, however, Monsanto’s strategy changed to one designed 
to erase regulatory barriers and ignore the complaints of critics on the way 
to rushing the new technology to market.179  The strategy and resulting 
regulatory schem
te.180 
The regulatory framework for transgenic crops involves the coordina-
tion of three federal agencies.181  The Food and Drug Administration 
(“FDA”) is responsible for regulating genetically modified food and 
feeds.182  The United States Department of Agriculture’s (“USDA”) Ani-
mal and Plant Health Inspection Service (“APHIS”) regulates importation 
and interstate movement of genetically modified crops, as well as oversees 
the introduction of transgenic crops into the environment.183  Finally, the 
Environmental Protection Agenc
s that produce pesticides.184 
Opponents of transgenic crops have been the most critical of the 
FDA’s policies.  The thrust of the FDA’s regulatory approach is to assess 
the risk posed by the product itself without regard to the process by which 
it was developed.185  Oversight is only appropriate when the risk is unrea-
sonable and when the benefits of oversight are greater than the related 
costs.186  Under the provisions of the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act 
(“FFDCA”), the FDA is responsible for regulating new foods and food ad-
ditives.187  The FFDCA gives the agency the power to regulate food labe-
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ling and approve all food additives.188  New substances added to foods 
must get approval in advance unless the FDA determines the substance is 
“generally recognized as safe” (“GRAS”).189  In 1992, the FDA announced 
a narrow view of its regulatory role with regard to genetically altered plants 
in its “Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties” 
(“Statement of Policy”).190  The FDA decided to apply existing regulations 
rather than generate new regulations for genetically modified varieties.191  
In its Statement of Policy, the FDA announced that genetically modified 
crops are the “substantial equivalent” of crops developed through conven-
tional breeding.192  As such, crops produced by the process of gene splicing 
are GRAS and therefore not subject to regulation as a food additive.193  
Based on this determination, the FDA completes no pre-market review of 
the products and requires no special labeling.194  Moreover, the producer 
rather than the FDA makes the determination as to whether a product quali-
fies as GRAS.195  However, even without pre-market regulation, producers 
face strong incentives to market safe products, including the threa
 liability, and even criminal l
JUDICIAL DEFERENCE 
Despite the apparent inconsistency presented by allowing a patent for 
a product that qualifies as a “distinct and new variety”197 of plant and the 
determination that the plant is the “substantial equivalent”198 to existing va-
rieties and therefore not subject to approval or labeling, the FDA’s position 
has been vindicated by the courts.  In Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shala-
la,199 a coalition of opponents of genetic engineering contested the FDA’s 
policy on genetically modified foods on several grounds.200  The District 
Court for the District of Columbia determined the FDA did not violate var-
ious procedural requirements when it developed its policy on transgenic 
crops.201  The court rejected the substantive challenges to the agency’s pol-
icy and deferred to the FDA’s presumption that transgenic crops are 
GRAS.202  The court was also deferential to the FDA’s position that no 
“material change” had occurred in the foods in question, obviating any 
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need for the agency to impose a labeling requirement.203  In fact, the court 
noted the FDA’s limited power to consider consumer demand when mak-
ing labeling decisions.204  The decision made it clear that a legal challenge 
would not be a very productive means of changing regulatory policy re-
garding transgenic crops.  However, the discovery process did uncover 
some disagreement among scientists at the FDA regarding the agency’s 
policy, which critics have used to cast further doubt on the wisdom of, and 
motivation for, the FDA’s policy on risk assessment.205  The trial also 
heightened public awareness of biotechnology and fueled the perception 
that the government was not sufficiently overseeing the development and
 
COST-BENEFIT REGULATION 
Though criticized as overly deferential to the interests of the biotech-
nology industry,207 the current regulatory scheme is consistent with the 
trend toward cost-benefit regulation.  Under the cost-benefit approach, an 
agency assesses the magnitude of a problem, attempts to assess tradeoffs, 
and uses effective and inexpensive tools to promote desired outcomes.208  
Proponents of this method argue that it is necessary, given the limited re-
sources available.209  Furthermore, proponents suggest the goal is not to let 
companies save money or to scale back regulation, but to ens
n is undertaken with a firm sense of its consequences.210 
The cost-benefit approach to regulation recognizes that the overesti-
mation of highly publicized risks creates pressure on governmental beha-
vior, especially when risks are novel and generate an exaggerated public 
response.211  As a result of strategic errors early on, the response to genetic 
alteration of food represents just such a reaction, resulting in many groups 
calling for a total ban.212  However, every regulation entails opportunity 
costs, and well-intentioned but ineffective risk regulations should not be 
viewed as morally or ethically superior.213  Regulation can lead to two 
types of errors: 1) rejecting something that is safe and effective or 2) ap-
proving something that is not safe and effective.214  Due to the cognitive 
difficulties people have assessing risk, current regulatory policies often 
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place excessive weight on the second type of error.215  The public is much 
more sensitive to errors of commission, which involve identifiable victims, 
than to errors of omission, where the loss of life or harm is statistical.216  
This tendency causes the public to favor overly-cautious regulation.  For 
example, many opponents of transgenic crops favor adopting the precau-
tionary principle, which posits, “When an activity raises threats of harm to 
human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken 
even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established scien-
tifically.”217  This id
 new activity. 
While proponents of cost-benefit regulation acknowledge some truth 
in the precautionary principle, they believe the concept goes too far.  For 
example, Cass Sunstein states, “Taken literally, the precautionary principle 
would lead to indefensibly huge expenditures, exhausting our budget well 
before the menu of options could be thoroughly consulted.”218  Public in-
terest groups and politicians tend to foster the view that the public can have 
it all.  To serve their own interests, these groups tend to exploit the public’s 
tendency to overreact to visible victims and to require undue caution in 
hindsight.  For example, one person harmed by a revolutionary drug on the 
evening news, has every public official clamoring to place blame for allow-
ing the product to reach the public.219  However, at the same time, those 
same politicians and the public bemoan regulatory processes that p
m other countries due to concerns about safet
LABELING AND THE RIGHT TO KNOW 
Despite the judicial affirmation of the FDA’s decision not to require 
mandatory labeling of transgenic foods, labeling continues to be one of the 
primary focuses of the debate.  In contrast to the nebulous moral arguments 
in opposition to genetic alteration itself, arguments for labeling find support 
in other areas of the law.  Advocates of labeling point out that consumer 
demand for labeling of genetically altered food remains consistently high. 
In 1999, a Time magazine poll found 81% of those polled wanted genetical-
ly engineered foods labeled, while the FDA received 50,000 written com-
ments largely supportive of labeling.221  In particular, the concerns about 
labeling include a desire to safeguard food, prevent allergic reactions, and 
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avoid interference with moral or religious practice.222  Co
e that without a label, consumers are unable to choose what they eat 
and cannot make informed decisions in the marketplace.223 
Furthermore, advocates of labeling note that, absent a label, people do 
not know they are placing themselves at risk, which is the opposite of the 
way agencies handle drugs and medical devices.224  The difference in han-
dling also suggests the public’s expectations about what government agen-
cies are doing to ensure the safety of transgenic food is greater than what 
regulators are actually doing.  This criticism about the public’s right to 
know proceeds from the idea of autonomy and finds traction in many of the 
same arguments that support informed consent.  Autonomy proceeds from 
the assumption that a competent adult should be able to make her own de-
cisions about what she wants to do with her 
valuable information, they are unable to make intelligent choices about 
the foods they buy and the risks they assume. 
In response, proponents of transgenic crops and the FDA maintain 
there is no difference between transgenic foods and those produced by tra-
ditional processes, thus labels are unnecessary.225  Supporters further note 
that there is no evidence of adverse health effects associated with transgen-
ic crops.226  This lack of evidence causes supporters to question what in-
formation there is a duty to disclose.  In addition, like informed consent, a 
question arises as to the standard that should determine what information 
the individual would want to know.  It would be unrealistic to provide con-
sumers with all the information available about all the components of each 
individual product, especially given the physical limita
, a labeling program would be very limited in the meaningful informa-
tion it provides consumers about safety and nutrition. 
Moreover, consumers may perceive mandatory labeling as a negative 
signal or voluntary labeling as implying superiority.227  Scientists and the 
food industry worry that a label would stigmatize transgenic crops, despite 
scientific evidence of their safety.  Finally, critics of labeling note that ex-
cessive labeling can be counterproductive by providing unnecessary infor-
mation.228  Any information strategy is subject to the same cognitive limi-
tations the public has making risk assessments, including that the costs may 
outweigh the benefit.229  Paradoxically, too much labeling presents a
 222 Id. at 761. 
 223 Colin A. Carter & Guillaume P. Gruere, 6 AGBIOFORUM 43, 43 (2003), available at 
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COMPROMISE AND COMMON GROUND 
Despite these potential difficulties, regulators have responded to pub-
lic pressure for labels.  Adopting a strong individual rights approach, Con-
gress has twice attempted to pass the Genetically Engineered Food Right-
to-Know Act, which would have created a labeling scheme independent of 
the FDA’s determination.230  Neither bill passed, but the growing pressure 
prompted the FDA to publish “Draft Guidance for Industry: Voluntary 
Labeling Indicating Whether Foods Have or Have Not Been Developed 
Using Bioengineering.”231  While maintaining its position that transgenic 
crops are safe, the FDA
 crops supported allowing manufacturers to voluntarily include some 
information regarding the development process as long as it was “truthful 
and not misleading.”232 
Although there are still objections on both sides of the issue, voluntary 
labeling appears to offer a reasonable compromise.  As we have seen, some 
effective labeling would help counteract the cognitive difficulty consumers 
have assessing risks.  In this way, the law merely assists economic actors in 
forming a well-informed contract.  If people do not have accurate risk per-
ceptions, their interactions will be inefficient.  Some form of labeling takes 
advantage of the understanding that a well-designed information effort can 
play a constructive role in sounder risk decisions.233  Moreover, regulation 
designed to provide information to the market can remedy the risk that 
dangerous products that are cheaper to produce will drive safer products 
out of the market when the consumer lacks pertinent information.234  To be 
effective, labeling should be only one part of an overall inform
rate informatio
on of the legitimate benefits and risks of transgenic crops. 
CONCLUSION 
As with most bioethical issues, it is unlikely that any single solution 
could satisfy all of the interested parties in the debate over genetically en-
gineered foods.  The failure of proponents of transgenic crops to effectively 
engage the public early in the process has polarized opinions on the issue 
and forestalled any meaningful discussion.  Upon closer examination, how-
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ever, it is clear that transgenic foods still represent an opportunity to open a 
dialogue that will help facilitate a consensus on this issue.  Once open, that 
dialogue can help create a framework for deciding the more difficult genet-
ic engineering issues on the horizon.  The importance of food has the pub-
lic engaged, and the lack of any religious objection to transgenic crops re-
moves some of the passion that can cloud the discussion of bioethical 
issues.  Without any significant fracture between the religious and the polit-
ical, discussions of the prop
on than other biotechnology issues.  In addition, the clear goals of 
transgenic crops provide a sound base on which to discuss the risks and 
benefits of transgenic crops. 
Accurate information is central to an effective dialogue about trans-
genic crops.  A regulatory environment focused on allowing the voluntary 
exchange of information lets those who want to share information do so, 
while facilitating an atmosphere of education that will enable the public to 
work toward a consensus on very difficult issues.  The law is not particular-
ly good at creating consensus, but instead works best when it allows for 
choice within limits and leaves
ive information campaign can help do that.  The free exchange of in-
formation and an educated dialogue also minimize the cognitive limitations 
that lead to irrational behavior. 
Political leaders in the United States and around the world must take a 
more active role in promoting a productive dialogue about genetic engi-
neering.  In addition to voluntary labeling, the federal government should 
create an informational infrastructure to facilitate the exchange of informa-
tion between manufacturers and the public. Government agencies, manu-
facturers, and opponents already provide a considerable amount of infor-
mation on the Internet, but there is no single place a consumer can go to get 
information and compare the arguments.  Part of an effective regulatory 
scheme should include an information clearinghouse for the most current 
information on biotechnology.  With a better understanding of the real risks 
and benefits associated with genetic engineering, an eng
meeting the agricultural ne
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
